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Abstract: This work develops a 
reflection over the Chinese economic 
structural imbalances, as evident in 
the aftermath of the 2008-2012 
Financial Crisis. To do so, it presents 
a review of some relevant concepts 
provided by, first, the current 
literature on the so called “middle 
income” economies; secondly, the 
work advances in the search of 
contributions originally produced by 
the Latin American Economic 
thought, together with theoretical 
developments formulated by Arthur 
Lewis work on development 
economics, considered as an 
appropriate tool for the analysis of 
the Chinese economic transition 
since 1978. This review is presented 
together with an exposition of the 
main traits of the Chinese economy, 
accomplished by means of aggregate 
indicators examination. From this 
analysis, we came to identify some 
traits that resemble China with an 
unbalanced productive structure. The 
economic imbalances of the Chinese 
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economy, in this regard, lay on the 
existing links between the country 
and the world economy and, finally, 
constitute major challenges for the 
sustainment of the development 
process. 
Keywords: China. Economy. 
Imbalances. Economic thought. 
 
Resumo: Este trabalho desenvolve 
uma reflexão sobre os desequilíbrios 
estruturais econômicos chineses, 
como evidenciado no rescaldo da 
Crise Financeira de 2008-2012. Para 
tanto, apresenta uma revisão de 
alguns conceitos relevantes 
fornecidos, em primeiro lugar, pela 
literatura atual sobre as chamadas 
economias de “renda média”; em 
segundo lugar, o trabalho avança na 
busca de contribuições originalmente 
produzidas pelo pensamento 
econômico latino-americano, 
juntamente com desenvolvimentos 
teóricos formulados pelo trabalho de 
Arthur Lewis sobre economia do 
desenvolvimento, considerado como 
uma ferramenta apropriada para a 
análise da transição econômica 
chinesa desde 1978. é apresentado 
em conjunto com uma exposição das 
principais características da 
economia chinesa, realizada por meio 
do exame de indicadores agregados. A 
partir dessa análise, chegamos a 
identificar alguns traços que 
lembram a China com uma estrutura 
produtiva desequilibrada. Os 
desequilíbrios econômicos da 
economia chinesa, nesse aspecto, 
assentam nos vínculos existentes 
entre o país e a economia mundial e, 
finalmente, constituem grandes 
desafios para a sustentação do 
processo de desenvolvimento. 
 





In the period under review, the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
recorded high rates of GDP growth 
until 2008. From then on, economic 
growth started to decline. At the same 
time, the PRC adopted indigenous 
mixes of Economic and social policies 
aiming at regulate the economic 
process, throughout the entire period. 
Such was also the pursued path 
among a relevant set of Latin 
American countries (Brazil and 
Argentina, for example). This process 
has been arduously debated by 
scholars and observers all over the 
world, and this article intends to 
contribute to this debate.  
In spite of this, both regions 
share also another common feature 
in the eyes of the international 
community: China and Latin America 
were often quoted as abnormal 
failures in the world order, with 
nothing good able to came out of 
them, so much in the economic field 
(i.e. technology, manufacture, etc) as 
in the field of ideas: by this token, 
both the “Sick Man of Asia” and the 
“American backyard” were strong 
lessons about what not to do in 
Economic Policy. 
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This work aims to trace some 
Latin American reflections about the 
so called underdeveloped societies, 
which we think might be fruitful for a 
comprehensive outlook of the 
challenges faced by these kind of 
societies, even in spite of the recent 
economic successes. By doing so, we 
move the focus of the analysis away 
from the inner dynamics (which 
would lead us into the consideration 
of leadership errors, indiscipline, 
excessive monetary emission or 
public spending, disrespect of 
comparative advantages, and so on, 
to explain the challenges faced by our 
countries), to turn it to the 
articulation of these dynamics with 
the global society into which they are 
occurring. 
This task is developed by a) a 
preliminary review and criticism of 
recent economic literature on “middle 
income” economies, b) a presentation 
of relevant literature produced within 
our region and able (to our mind) to 
provide concepts for the analysis of 
the main Chinese and Latin American 
economic bottlenecks, and c) a 
succinct explanation of the main 
traits of the Chinese economy, 
developed by means of aggregate 
indicators exam. All this work goes in 
order to justify our hypothesis, which 
goes as follows: China shares some 
features of an unbalanced productive 
structure, driven in its economic 
cycles by recurring episodes of 
inflationary pressures. These 
pressures are in turn due in part to 
an underlying contradiction between 
accumulation and consumption. 
This hypothesis has two 
corollaries: first, as already 
suggested, this contradiction is due 
to the structural position shared 
during its previous XXth century 
history among the world order. 
Secondly, we must cast a serious 
doubt on mainstream economics 
scholarly pleas on “innovation” and 
“openness” as means to overcome 
current difficulties, frequently named 
as “middle income traps.” Instead, we 
must look at the current existing 
links between domestic economies 
and the international world order.  
2. Middle income trap? 
We start our analysis by stating 
a recent fact, which is currently a 
concerning issue for the Chinese 
leadership: the apparent slowdown of 
economic growth indexes, since the 
outburst of the 2008 financial Crisis. 
We show in Chart 1 the average 
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indexes of GDP growth for a long term period, 1963-2012
126 
 
Chart 1. GDP growth (annual %) 
 
World Bank, 2013 
 
                                                 
126
 We deliberately excluded the Great Leap Forward Period. Therefore, in order to look into the performance of the 
Chinese Economy during and after the Maoist era, we start our analysis by 1963. 
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This trend might constitute 
merely a short-term minimum 
variation in the experienced index of 
growth since 1978 (as seen in our 
chart, China clearly experienced more 
serious challenges between 1989-
1990), but for the appearance of 
some structural emerging problems 
and, secondly, for the World Bank 
recent elaborations about the so 
called “middle income”127 trap, 
threatening to halt Chinese economic 
development.  
Originally, the concept was first 
sketched in a Foreign Affairs article 
by Geoffrey Garreth (GARRETH, 
2004: 84-96) and then further 
developed in the East Asia 
Renaissance…document from the 
Bank, (INDERMIT, KHARAS et.al., 
2007:17-18) based only on 
neoclassical assumptions of 
diminishing marginal returns to 
capital.128  
In a nutshell, 
The idea that middle-income 
countries have to do something 
different if they are to prosper is 
                                                 
127
 The middle income status is defined by the Bank 
itself, with the upper limit set at around U$S 12,000 of 
GNI per capita. 
128
 Most of the Chinese (and East Asian, and Latin 
American, for that matters) growth was accomplished 
by virtue of factor inputs. (COLLINS, BOSWORTH 
and RODRIK, 1996:135-203) 
consistent with the finding that 
middle-income countries have grown 
less rapidly than either rich or poor 
countries, and this accounts for the 
lack of economic convergence in the 
twentieth century world. Middle-
income countries, it is argued, are 
squeezed between the low-wage poor-
country competitors that dominate in 
mature industries and the rich-
country innovators that dominate in 
industries undergoing rapid 
technological change. (INDERMIT, 
KHARAS et.al., 2007:17) 
Later on, the limits of the trap 
were set on the basis of income 
definitions established by the Bank 
itself. (see AGÉNOR and CANUTO, 
2012) From then on, economic 
literature spent efforts to determine, 
by regression and cross country 
statistical data review, the existence 
of such a trap. These efforts implied 
also the determination of a minimum 
required time span for the 
persistence of a country within the 
middle income category. Secondly, 
more empirical studies were devoted 
to the quest for the sources of the 
traps, testing several factors and 
indicators inhibiting economic 
growth. By this token, social justice, 
educational factors, natural 
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resources endowment, etc., were 
recently detected as possible 
explanations of per capita income 
stagnation. (ROBERTSON and YE, 
2013; FELIPE, ABDON and KUMAR, 
2012; PEERENBOM, 2013) 
In spite of this, the concept 
itself has been criticized several 
times, on accounts of its ambiguity 
and non-specific character. 
Concretely, what do income level tells 
us about the main and specific 
features of a concrete economy? What 
kind of achievement accomplishes a 
country by breaking the 12,000 dollar 
barrier of per capita income? These 
questions remain (so far) unanswered 
by the middle income trap concept, 
thus vaguely defined. (JIANG, 
2013:129-140) Therefore, some 
corrections were proposed to it, 
implying a) a multidimensional 
approach in order to select and 
classify sample countries, and b) the 
definition of several traps instead of 
one, in order to explain existing 
inhibitions to economic growth 
among middle income economies. 
 
3. Structural imbalances in 
peripheral economies 
Having situated the “middle 
income trap” debate among a 
conventional and mostly empirical 
framework, we chose to take a 
different approach in order to better 
describe the main problems affecting 
peripheral economies. This approach, 
precisely, came from Latin-American 
Structuralist Political Economy. 
The virtue of this school lies in 
the definition of structural forces and 
mechanisms dictating the main traits 
of a national economy, given its 
specific position within a wider world 
order. It was Raúl Prebisch, first, and 
later Celso Furtado, whom opened 
this theoretical point of view. While 
Prebisch insisted on a secular 
deterioration in the terms of trade for 
natural-resources commodity 
exporters,129 Furtado stated the 
concept of underdevelopment, not as 
a required stage for development,130 
but as a by-product of capitalist 
development within the world order. 
Furtado defines underdevelopment as 
                                                 
129
 Although these premises were discarded among the 
Washington Consensus ideological climate, now they 
are again re-examined in light of fluctuating price 
trends for commodity exports. See CAVALCANTIAY, 
MOHADDESAB and RAISSIC, 2012 
130
 This feature in Furtado’s thought marks a clear 
difference between ECLA’s developmentalist economic 
thought and Rostow’s Modernization Theory, widely 
supported by the American State Department on its 
time. This point is worth to stress because, later on, 
developmentalist research on East Asian Economies 
were influenced by this last view, rather than by Latin 
American structuralism. This is clearly corresponding 
with the diverging US role in both regions after World 
War II. 
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the capitalist-induced constitution of 
hybrid economies in the periphery of 
the world system. These economies 
are in fact dual economies, with a 
modern-capitalist sector (generally 
constituted by foreign investment in 
resource-based sectors) aiming to 
produce for the world market, and 
with the decision centres located in 
the core of the world system 
(multinational companies, and/or 
metropolitan States). Together with 
this “modern” sector and surrounding 
it, underdevelopment implies the 
persistence of a traditional, pre-
capitalist sector, maintaining and 
reinforcing its traits as foreign-
induced economic growth takes 
place. (FURTADO, 1964:165) 
This point is one of particular 
relevance to our purposes, because 1) 
dualism implies a chronic shortage of 
capital during the process of 
economic growth, eventually leading 
to recurrent short-term crisis, and 2) 
a structural imbrication is produced 
between the two sectors of the 
economy, whereby the modern sector 
grows by seizing factors and 
resources from the traditional sector. 
This relation might take different and 
concrete historical forms,131 
(FURTADO, 1964:213-246) as we will 
see next in the case of China. 
Precisely, China poses serious 
challenges for underdevelopment 
theory: this theory stresses the role of 
the traditional sector of the economy 
merely as a provider of wage 
labour,132 and neglects the positive 
role of an unlimited supply of labour 
for the economy as a whole. 
This leads us to consider 
Arthur W. Lewis model of economic 
development, which posits a more 
accurate explanation of rural-urban 
transition for the case of China,133 
                                                 
131
 See two alternative approaches to the rural-urban 
transition process and, therefore, to the relation 
between the modern and traditional sector of the 
economy (albeit constructed on the basis of the Sub-
Saharan African experience), in ARRIGHI, 1969; and 
the classic work of the French Marxist anthropologist 
Claude Meillassoux (MEILLASSOUX, 1987)  
132
 In Furtado’s model, the impact of the modern sector 
on the per capita income of the traditional sector might 
take different forms along the process. In Burma and 
Ceylan, for instance, a rigid supply of labour in the 
traditional sector created, on behalf of the demand 
arising from the modern plantation sector, a situation of 
underutilized factors together with an absolute rise in 
the wage levels of both sectors, without a structural 
transformation of the economy (namely, development). 
In the Brazilian case, instead, the result of foreign-
induced development was the formation of a three-tier 
economic structure: one level was constituted by 
subsistence activities within the traditional sector; a 
second tier was constituted by the export sector, driven 
by foreign investment; and, finally, an incipient 
economy devoted to the production for the domestic 
market, given the ability of local workers to defend its 
standard of living. This ability depended on particular 
conditions of inner rural and foreign immigration, basis 
of the making of Brazilian working class. (FURTADO, 
1969:169-173)  
133
 Ironically, what Lewis had in mind was African 
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(LEWIS, 1963;1986) in spite of being 
partially constructed under 
neoclassical assumptions. 
Concretely, Lewis starts from the 
observation of dual underdeveloped 
economies (like Furtado did); this, for 
Lewis, implied an imbalance between 
an excess of labour in the traditional 
sector, versus a shortage of labour in 
the modern, capitalized sector. This 
imbalance implied in turn different 
factor remunerations in both sectors, 
with wages at subsistence levels in 
the traditional economy, and wages 
determined in the modern sector not 
by marginal productivity of labour, 
but by the minimum wage in the 
subsistence sector. Therefore, the 
establishment of wages just above 
this minimum in the modern sector 
allows for the massive influx of 
workers into the cities and industries, 
given the feasibility of labour mobility 
(which constituted, for us, an 
important factor in the Chinese 
reform). The final crucial assumption 
for this model to work this way, is the 
unlimited supply of labour in the 
rural areas and in the informal sector 
of the economy, nurturing urban 
                                                                            
supposed transition from a rural economy towards 
economic development. History, unfortunately for 
Africa, denied Lewis thesis for these economies in 
favour of the unforeseen Chinese transition. 
growth and economic development. 
Along this process, however, and in 
the long run, economic development 
implies the levelling of this dual-cost 
structure, thereby achieving optimal 
factor allocation. From this point on, 
the economy reaches the neoclassical 
“equilibrium” point, and labour is 
rewarded for its marginal product.134 
When this allocation is achieved, the 
economy reaches its maturity and 
acquires an homogenous character. 
Economic growth, on the other hand, 
starts to slow its pace. 
This is consistent with the 
sustained expansion of per capita 
income in aggregate terms in China 
from 1978 on, as much as with the 
sustained rural income and regional 
disparity, corresponding with labour 
demanding and supplying regions, 
displayed in Table 1.  
                                                 
134
 According to Furtado, a major flaw in neoclassical 
economic theory is its incapacity to explain economic 
growth and development, given optimal factor 
allocation and zero benefit. The virtue of Lewis model 
is to be able to combine neoclassical assumptions with 
an “exogenous” explanation of economic 
transformation, from the observation of the evident 
dualism existing in peripheral economies. For 
additional criticism to the neoclassical stationary 
model, albeit from a different perspective, see 
AGLIETTA, 1979.  
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1978 133,6 343,4 2,57 
1985 397,6 739,1 1,86 
1988 544,9 1181,4 2,17 
1992 784 2026,6 2,58 
2001 2366,4 6859,6 2,9 
2009 5153,2 17174,7 3,33 
2011 6977,3 21809,8 3,13 
 
NBS (2018). China Statistical Yearbook, vs. years. 
 
This process, above all, 
explained the phenomenal 30-year 
economic growth period at high rates, 
and the continuity of it (albeit, as 
stated, at lowe rates). However, the 
model does not account for two 
factors: a) the continuous process of 
capital formation in the economy, 
and b) the recurrence of economic 
cycles, manifested in the Reform and 
Opening-up period by often violent 
inflationary episodes in urban areas. 
Both factors are intertwined, as we 
will be able to see. 
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Chart 2. GCF, 1963-2012 (% GDP) 
 
World Bank, 2013 
  
Chart 3. GCF and inflation, 1986-2012 (%) 
 
World Bank, 2013 
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Since 1949, development and 
structural transformation in the 
Chinese economy proceeded through 
a) a State driven capital 
accumulation in the 1949-1978 
period, b) the elimination of rural 
landlord classes at the beginning of 
the same period, and c) in the period 
opened in 1978, a Lewisian path of 
rural labour absorption.135 However, 
this last period was also marked by 
an absolute rise in income levels 
(both in rural and urban areas, albeit 
maintaining rural-urban disparity), 
which eventually led to inflationary 
pressures. This implies, in our view, 
that there is a contradiction between 
popular consumption and capital 
accumulation. There is no traits in 
Lewis model which helps us explain 
this cycles within a developing 
economy, nor the persistence of 
structural inflation (implying an 
unbalance between investment and 
consumption).136 
                                                 
135
 Concretely, the beginning of the process was in 
great measure allowed by the official tolerance of 
authorities to rural – urban migration in the aftermath 
of the Cultural Revolution, together with the 
authorization to rural families enacted in 1979 to 
undertake production decisions in their own (de facto) 
plots. Consequently. over 27 million people flew into 
the cities between 1975 and 1979, reversing twenty 
years of negative rural-to urban migration rates. 
(RISKIN, 1987: 266-267. 
136
 Concretely, “Capital formation and technical 
progress does not translate into wage increases, but in 
an increase in the participation of benefits into the 
Recently, there has been much 
debate about the exhaustion of 
Lewisian path to development within 
Chinese economy, given that 
urbanization (within the scope of 55-
60% of total population137) might 
imply the exhaustion of the unlimited 
labour supply reserves. Actually, 
there is growing evidence of rising 
labour costs in coastal cities, 
reinforcing this hypothesis. However, 
there is no concrete and aggregate 
quantification of this increase, 
suggesting the existence (even today) 
of the continuity of the labor-
absorbing path. (CAI, DU and YANG, 
2009) 
Therefore, we will focus instead 
on our defined contradiction in order 
to apprehend the main bottlenecks 
inhibiting the Chinese economic 
development. To do so, we will 
conclude our theoretical review by 
                                                                            
national progress.” Regarding inflation, “inflation with 
the purpose of capital creation is self´-destructive, 
suicide. Prices climb whilst capital is created, and they 
decrease later, as the production reaches to market in 
the national progress.” (LEWIS, 1963: 733). That is, 
another neoclassical assumption based on optimal 
factor allocation, which supposes what could be 
regarded as a short-term disequilibrium. For Furtado, 
instead, inflation is a structural trait of development, 
linked with resource appropriation by industrial 
capitalist classes. Policy recommendations stresses, 
according to this model, State administration of 
investment allocation during the process, which of 
course does not eliminate the inflation phenomenon. 
137
 Given the existing restrictions to urban registration 
of migrants, the official figure of 45% rural population 
is an  underestimate value. 
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explaining this contradiction, as 
expressed in inflation pressure, 
through an exam of the relation 
between exports, domestic growth, 
and exchange rate. This, in turn, will 
allow us to look into the last twenty 
years of the Chinese economic 
development. 
In order to turn the Chinese 
economy more or less comparable 
with another peripheral economies, 
we must look so much into its 
structural inner limitations, as much 
as into the ways in which developing 
economies insert themselves into the 
world capitalist economy. These ways 
produce, in fact, unbalanced 
productive structures in developing 
countries.138 This concept is a 
resemblance of Furtado’s dual 
economies, in the sense that 
economic growth in these structures 
is driven primarily by the export 
sector.139 The primacy of the export 
sector translate itself into an official 
exchange rate in accordance with the 
actual productivity of this sector, 
generally higher than in the rest of 
                                                 
138
 The concept was developed and applied in 
DIAMAND, 1972, 1978, 1988.  
139
 This is the case in Lewis model as well. In Furtado’s 
view, this trait corresponds with the underdevelopment 
situation, before structural transformation. From then 
on, if accomplished, domestic market plays a major 
role in development. 
the economy. With respect to the 
domestic market producing sector, 
the established exchange rate is then 
relatively lower than required, 
making competition difficult with 
import products. The next 
consequence of this exchange relation 
is the constant influx of foreign 
currency along with the successful 
development of economic growth. 
These resources are devoted, by the 
domestic industrial corporate sector 
and by the State, to investment 
projects and to the acquirement of 
capital goods, pressing over the 
exchange rate. By doing so, 
pronounced tensions are introduced 
during the economic cycle, 
conditioned by a) A shortage of 
capital and foreign currency within 
the national economy, b) A crescent 
loss of competitiveness of the 
industrial sector, produced by the de 
facto valorisation of the exchange 
rate, and c) A progressive erosion of 
the public sector foreign reserves. 
These tensions are temporarily 
managed by the government through 
the resource to foreign indebtedness; 
this in turn aggravates the situation, 
because the reserves are then 
“evaporated” through an additional 
bleeding, the payment of principal 
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and interests of foreign debt. All this 
situation is solved, finally, through 
an abrupt devaluation that 
temporarily readjusts the foreign 
exchange relation, until the cycle 
resumes again. This is known in the 
peripheral economies specialized 
literature as stop and go cycles. 
Ultimately, and given the fact that 
devaluation implies resource 
transfers from wage and fixed income 
earners towards the capitalist 
classes, a depression in popular 
income is produced during the 
downturn phase of the economic 
cycle. 
Summing up, in unbalanced 
productive structures, we have: 
a) A relative primacy of external 
sector, 
b) A chronical shortage of 
capital, and 
c) A systematic repression of 
living and consumption standards. 
In the short term, the 
transition phase between each stage 
of the cycle manifests itself in 
inflationary pressures during the 
exhaustion of foreign reserves until, 
finally, they are unleashed by a 
devaluation of the exchange rate. 
This is translated into the 
actual reality of China, as follows: 
there might be maintained the 
existence of a structural tension, as 
in the peripheral economies. This 
tension expresses itself in a 
contradiction between the need for 
accumulation and capital formation, 
on one hand, and popular 
consumption and real per capita 
income rise on the other hand. Even 
since the period of planned economy, 
there were oscillations between 
policies oriented to reduce capital 
accumulation levels (for instance, 
1962-1965) towards the increase in 
wage levels, and the authorization to 
the operation of private autonomous 
activity. These policies are 
conditioned by the existence of 
previous overinvestment levels, and 
by the deterioration of per capita 
income levels (verified, for instance, 
between 1958 and 1962). However, in 
order to precise more specific features 
within the Chinese economy 
expressing this contradiction, we 
must look separately for its main 
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4. An outlook of the Chinese 
economic structure 
 
We referred in our last section 
to structural disequilibria between 
accumulation and consumption, as 
this was evident during the Maoist 
period. Concretely, and much like in 
the Soviet experience, the State 
accumulated capital during that 
period at the expense of a) the 
traditional landlord ruling classes, 
and b) the standard of living of the 
common peasantry. This allowed for 
the construction of an integrated 
industrial structure, although how 
much of this structure was functional 
to the post-Maoist economic reform 
model, is still subject to debate. 
Finally, and in spite of the debate, 
this feature states a clear difference 
between the Chinese economy and a 
“typical” peripheral economy, as 
defined by Furtado.140 
                                                 
140
 Regarding State appropriation of peasant income, it 
was stated as a trait of several late development 
economies. For Japan, see TAKAHASHI, 1986: 60-
115. A classical sociological work qualified Maoist 
agrarian policy in the following terms: peasants were 
“subject to renewed overburdens and pressures when 
introduced into the modern world (albeit) having been 
supplied the most important revolutionary destructive 
force that threw away the old order; they were propped 
into (…) the modern era under communist regimes that 
maid (them) its predilect victim.” (MOORE, 1993:9). 
As for Brazil, the resistance of traditional elites was 
broken, according with Furtado, during the ‘50s and 
early ‘60s within the State apparatus, allowing for the 
accomplishment of structural transformation. Later on, 
The first decade of economic 
reform in China, as already stated, 
marked the beginning of the Lewisian 
path of development, and this allowed 
for the accumulation of capital on 
that basis. However, urban inflation 
surged repeatedly between 1986 and 
1989, lying behind social conflict and 
eventually wounding up in the 
Tiananmen crisis. This crisis stopped 
the pace of economic reform, and the 
government cut investment in order 
to control urban inflation. In 
addition, much of the capital already 
flowing into the country ceased, by 
means of the economic blockade 
implemented by Western countries. 
The crisis finally concluded in 1992 
with Deng Xiaping’s decision to 
resume and accelerate the opening-
up process, and this had two major 
consequences in economic terms: 
first, the acceleration in the pace of 
capital inflows to China, this time 
driven directly by European and US 
investment.141 Secondly, the growing 
competition stressed the financial 
                                                                            
the author regretted for the reversion of this 
accomplishment after the 1964 coup d’état, and 
pledged for the abandonment of neoliberal policies in 
order to resume the path to development. See ROCHA, 
2007:132-159. 
141
 During the 1989-1992 period, the scarce amount of 
capital entering to the country was channeled through 
Chinese diaspora investors, mainly from Hong Kong, 
Singapore and Taiwan. 
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situation of State – Owned 
enterprises, requiring urgent 
corporate reform. (NAUGHTON, 
2007:100-107) We can see inward 
FDI in the Reform period in Chart 4 
(absolute terms) and 5 (as a 
percentage of GDP). This last chart 
displays the increasing importance of 
foreign investment during the ‘90s. 
More precisely, real surge of foreign 
investment occurred in 1993. 
 
Chart 4. FDI inflows (1988-2012) (current U$S) 
 
World Bank, 2013 
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Chart 5. FDI inflows, % of GDP (1988-2012) 
 
World Bank, 2013 
 
The above stated has three 
profound implications to our 
purposes. First that, evidently, 
inflation could be effectively 
controlled after 1995 by the 
leadership. Second, that much of this 
success, conventionally attributed to 
the downsizing and transfer of state 
assets implemented between 1993-
1997, is due in great measure to the 
sustained capital inflows arriving into 
the domestic economy. Third, that 
public corporate sector, usually 
producing in this stage for the 
domestic market, started to work 
during the 1993-1997 transition as 
the domestic industrial sector in an 
unbalanced productive structure: 
that is, started to suffer competition 
from the external sector, demanded 
crescent financial assistance, and 
thereby stressed the State fiscal 
budget. This situation, eventually, 
could only be superseded by the 
application of a mixed policy that a) 
pursued the gradual liberalization of 
MUNDO E DESENVOLVIMENTO 




the economy, b) transferred the bulk 
of loss-making enterprises to the 
private sector, thereby drastically 
reducing State employment, and c) 
selected strategic-sector enterprises 
and promoted the conformation of a 
highly protected core of State 
conglomerates, aiming to turn it 
competitive in the world market, and 
able to absorb and develop high 
technology. Chinese accession into 
the WTO, in 2001, only reinforced 
this pattern of growth. 
 
Chart 6. Real effective growth rate, 1978-2012 (2005=100) 
 
World Bank, 2013 
 
In spite of this process, and in 
spite of a detected reduction in the 
recurrence of economic cycles, 
certain structural problems in 
Chinese economic model should be 
reinterpreted in light of our 
conceptual framework: first, there is 
a dependence of economic growth 
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from the export sector, as evidenced 
in the amount of FDI received from 
the ‘90s on. This can be remarked 
from the observation of the 
percentage of exports in GDP. 
Concretely, FDI was applied in good 
measure to install re-export platforms 
by transnational corporations 
towards the US and European 
consumer markets, producing also 
semi-elaborated products for 
Japanese and South Korean 
companies, thereby reinforcing 
regional integration.
 
Chart 7. Exports as % of GDP, 1978-2012 
 
World Bank, 2013 
 
With 35 years of economic 
reform, and having overcome high 
inflation rates experienced during the 
‘80s on the basis of massive influx of 
investment, the outcome in 2012 was 
the increasing exposition of the 
economy to the global turbulences. 
We can see this trait in chart 8, 
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displaying the Chinese financial 
position with the world (Balance of 
Payments). 
 
Chart 8. Chinese Balance of Payments, 1984-2012 
 




Therefore, the relative 
dependence from the external sector 
might imply the subordination of the 
domestic economy, at a stage of 
prevalence of financial capital over 
industrial production and investment 
decisions; that is, an external 
environment radically different than 
the international framework in which 
Structuralist Economics developed its 
tenets. This situation called for the 
State adoption of strong anticyclical 
policies to overcome global shocks, as 
evidenced between 2008-2009. 
However, the increasing proportion of 
portfolio investments (see chart 8) 
might neutralize the effectiveness of 
these kind of policies in the future, 
thereby reducing State autonomy. 
It could be pointed out that 
these difficulties are shared by every 
national economy embedded in the 
globalization process, however central 
or peripheral these economies were. 
We can find enough support for this 
assumption in practically every daily 
analysis developed by any report 
press. However, some specific 
features of Chinese economy deserve 
a close attention. 
First, anticyclical economic 
policies in China are remarkably 
expansionary, rapidly spilling out 
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banking sector. This in turn is 
explained by the remarkably high 
savings rate existing in domestic 
economy. These savings are unable to 
be channeled into domestic 
consumption, therefore heading 
towards investment in capital goods 
and infrastructure sectors serving 
exports development, given the 
outward orientation of the economy. 
As the exports sector grows faster 
than the domestic goods industrial 
sector, inflationary pressures have 
reemerged (MANTZOPOULOS and 
SHEN, 2011:168). In the meantime, 
the successful development of the 
export sector pushes down the 
exchange rate by means of foreign 
currency influx, as in an unbalanced 
economic structure. In the already 
stated downturn economic 
environment, a relevant risk is in the 
order of the day: an eventual and 
sudden fall in exports price or 
volume, able to generate excess 
capacity and unemployment, might 
push for a reduction in the domestic 
demand, thereby creating a vicious 
cycle in the economy.  
We find here, in sum, and in 
spite of the remarkable success in 
structural transformation achieved by 
the country (not only in the last 35 
years, but from the creation of the 
People’s Republic), a relative difficulty 
in the achievement of a balanced and 
parallel growth of consumption and 
investment, at the expenses of the 




We stated in our theoretical 
review, first, the inadequacy of the 
“middle income trap” concept in order 
to deal with the current challenges 
faced by the Chinese economy and, 
secondly, even to depict the main 
traits of this kind of economy. This is 
due to the merely empirical 
elaboration of the concept, by virtue 
of induction and convention. 
Secondly, we delved in Latin 
American economic thought in order 
to get a better comprehension of the 
structural features of the Chinese 
economy. By doing this, we did not 
pretend to fit China into the 
theoretical suit of dependency theory, 
or structuralist thought. Surely, there 
is a crucial difference between China 
and the Latin American economies: 
for instance, in the degree of 
integration, knowledge, and value-
added in industry. However, we did 
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pretend to illuminate some aspects 
concerning the modes of articulation 
of an economy embarked in an 
accelerated process of structural 
transformation with its surrounding 
environment. As a result, we came to 
the following conclusion: during its 
transition process, China relied on 
two pillars: rural-urban transition, 
and resource transfers from the core 
of the world economy. Both elements 
contributed to capital formation, but 
this process introduced imbalances 
between investment and 
consumption, which is a typical 
feature of a peripheral economy.  
The above-stated features, of 
course, are a matter of concern for 
the Chinese leadership, although 
expressed in a different language 
than our framework did. On the other 
hand, the measures devised to deal 
with the problems derived from these 
traits are far from being a safe bid. 
The Chinese government proposes, 
for instance, the deepening of the 
openness of its economy to foreign 
capital, in a context well different 
from the early ‘90s. The prevalence of 
financial capital in the global 
economy, for instance, is nowadays 
much more pronounced. Secondly, 
the measures adopted or in adoption 
in order to deal with the expansion of 
consumption, implied as a 
counterpart the increased promotion 
of rural-urban migration, and the 
detachment of peasants from their 
land in order to incorporate them as 
consumers. Moreover, the resources 
provided for the reinforcement of an 
incipient social safety net would come 
from the decrease in public 
investment (with special emphasis on 
local governments budget 
reductions), from the rationalization 
of the financial and banking system 
by means of its opening-up to foreign 
investment, and from the building of 
a truly functional capital market. 
These sets of measures could only 
multiply the influence of foreign 
capital, only that this time allocated 
mostly in the financial sector. The 
success of this kind of policy lies, in 
turn, in the ability of the financial 
sector to allocate resources for 
investment in response to a 
supposedly crescent demand induced 
by the promotion of consumption. By 
this token, investment decisions are 
left to market forces. If demand is not 
sufficiently pumped by public 
spending (in fact, the proposed 
policies are based on fiscal 
tightening) it is not sure that 
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domestic market will function in the 
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